Standard macroeconomic models make a sharp distinction between equilibrium and actual unemployment. Equilibrium unemployment is determined by labor ((1985) for example). Gregory (1986) , looking at Australia, was the first to argue that insider considerations could explain high sustained unemployment. The implications for aggregate unemployment have also been examined by Lindbeck and Snower (1984) , Blanchard and Summers (1986a) and Gottfries and Horn (1986 We can capture these effects by modifying equation (3) to read :
where n is the labor force and En is expected employment , so that (n-En) is expected unemployment. The stronger the effect of unemployment on wage setting, the larger the expected level of employment in firm 1, the lower the nominal wage w. . Let us assume that n.* -n.(-l), the membership rule, which in the absence of pressure from outsiders, leads to a random walk in employment.
Solving, as before, for the level of employment gives : (6) n-n -(l/(l+b)) (n(-l)-n) + (m-Em) Employment now follows a first order process around the level of the -labor force. Thus, if the labor force evolves slowly over time, unemployment also follows approximately a first order autoregression. The degree of persistence is a function of b. If b is equal to zero, employment follows a random walk. As b increases however, the degree of persistence decreases. After 4 The implicaticiis of the ability of insiders to cooperate or harass outsiders has been explored by Lindbeck and Snower (1986) , under the assumption of Nash bargaining between insiders and outsiders. 5 Actual employment is not known at the time of bargaining.
-8-an adverse shock for example, actual unemployment increases, and so does Gquilibrium unereployment ; in the absence of subsequent surprises, unemployment eventually returns to a given value. But, during the transition, short run equilibrium unemplo^^inent is high.
If we look at richer membership rules, the results parallel those of the previous section. If it takes time to lose or acquire membership, only long sequence of shocks of the same sign will change equilibrium unemployment. Once it has changed however, it will only slowly (if b is small) go back to its initial value.
A. UnemploN'Tiient Duration and the Wage Setting Process Tne first model we presented assumed that the unemployed had no effect on vage setviing while the model of the previous section assumed that all the unemployed exerted some downward pressure on the wage. A plausible intermediate position is that only the short term unemployed who have worked recently exert downward pressure on wages. Empirical results by Layard and Nickell (1986), and Nickell (1986) Assuming initially that short term unemployment is roughly equal to the change in unemployment, (we return below to the appropriateness of this assi'jnption) equation (3') may be modified to read:
Thus, we assume that wage pressure from the outsiders depends not on total unemployment, but on (expected) short term unemployment. Assuming that the membership rule for insiders is still n.* -n.(-l), and solving for aggregate employment gives :
We recover our initial result that employment follows a -.andom walk. This is now the result of both the behavior of insiders, and the fact that only the short term unemployed put pressure on wages.
This full persistence result is however too strong. The c^mamic relation 6 Another possibility is that the long term unemployed exert less pressure on wages because employers treat protracted unemployment as an adverse signal. Rational employers will however revise upwards their assessment of the ability of the long term unemployed when macroeconomic developments beyord the control of any single worker increase long term unemployment. Blanchard and Summers (1986a) and (1986b) 
